(The cogitations of my heart are so convoluted, how can I then explain them to my protagonist; How can I structure a harmonious relationship when the very impulses and motivations for the relationship are not there).

A former South Asian diplomat used the above phrases to define India-Pakistan talks in the 1980s and they seem valid even today. India and Pakistan conducted Foreign Secretary level talks on November 14 and 15 in New Delhi.

The two countries agreed to set up a six-member panel to counter terrorism and to ensure "regular and timely sharing of information" A nuclear safety agreement was signed and the two countries will hold quarterly flag meetings of the local army commanders. However, no progress took place on reducing troops in Kashmir and in Siachen.

On the eve of the talks the Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee had emphasized the importance of terrorism and of holding Pakistan to the assurances it had given previously. The Pakistani foreign minister, Mr Kasuri, however, had said that Pakistan was a victim of terrorism too, that any form of "blame game" should be avoided and the joint terror mechanism would help reduce the "trust deficit" between the two countries.

After the talks Mr Kasuri was pleased with the establishment of the joint terror mechanism but Mr Mukherjee claimed, in a television interview, that Pakistan was still allowing jihadis to use Pakistani soil for attacks on India.

The next round of talks between the foreign secretaries of the two countries will take place in February 2007. It will be preceded by talks between the foreign ministers of both countries during the next SAARC meet, in December or January in Islamabad.

These talks have followed along the lines of previous talks between India and Pakistan for the last few decades. Talks are held, promises are made and things seem to be moving along just fine for some time. Then as soon as a terrorist incident takes place in India or Pakistan both sides point the finger to the other, call off talks and spout hawkish rhetoric. A few months pass by and international and domestic pressure forces the two sides to meet on the sidelines of an international or regional meeting and the process takes off once again.

The roots of the present talks between India and Pakistan are both domestic and international. Indian Prime Ministers, either when they lack any grass roots base or when they want to 'make their mark in history', have always seen the resolution of the India-Pakistan dispute (including Kashmir) as their claim to fame. It is equally true for I.K. Gujral, Atal Behari Vajpayee or Manmohan Singh.

Since the 1990s with the end of the Cold War (and the loss of Soviet Union and its veto power) and faced with a unipolar world Indian elite have tried to build close ties with the United States. The rising economic, political and strategic ties between the two countries have also increased the international pressure on India to solve its long-standing dispute with Pakistan. If India wants to be a global power it has to rise above the region and for that it needs to solve, or at least lessen, the tensions with Pakistan. Also American desire to prevent another conflagration between India and Pakistan, especially since they are nuclear weapons states now, has resulted in pressures on both countries.

Pakistan too has both domestic and international pressures, which have forced it to have talks with India. Though Pakistan has always been dependent on American support and aid, that aid is always much higher during military rule. This leads to a situation where there is a lot more international pressure on the military governments to try to repair relations with India.

Plus sa change, plus se la mem chose (the more things change, the more they remain the same). The latest round of talks has followed the same pattern as previous ones and unless they are rescued by some dramatic turn of events there is every chance they will meet a similar fate.

India insists that Pakistan knows the existence and location of the terror camps that operate against India and it would like Pakistan to live up to its promises. Pakistan claims that there are "local impulses" and "international dimensions" to acts of terrorism. This is the stance taken by President Musharraf that though Pakistan would help fight any 'foreign terrorists' aka Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden, local 'freedom fighters' like the Kashmiri jihadis and the Taliban were not under their control and were autonomous organizations.

This is not to say that India and Pakistan should not hold talks or that because the two sides have not been able to resolve their disputes till now they should not try to do so. It is important to talk to Pakistan and India must continue to do so; neighbors are people we have to live with and we must find ways to resolve any disputes. However we need to be more realistic in both our goals and our assessments.

Just as it makes no sense to cancel talks and blame Pakistan every time there is a blast in India; similarly it is childish to suddenly move from 'no talks with Pakistan' to 'talks on every issue are acceptable.' Mr Menon, the former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan and the present Indian foreign secretary, is supposed to be someone who understands "Pakistani sensitivities." A major background to these talks have been the belief by Mr Menon that his one year in Pakistan has helped him build relations with the Pakistani establishment, relations deep enough for the two countries to overcome the 'culture of mistrust and grievance.

' It is naiveté to believe that without any return to genuine democracy in Pakistan there has been a change in the underlying views of the Pakistani military-bureaucratic establishment. In his 2005 book a leading Pakistani expert, and a former government insider and diplomat, Husain Haqqani talked about the 'policy tripod' of Pakistan. Haqqani pointed out that an anti-India stance was a key aspect of the Pakistani military-technocratic establishment's outlook. He emphasized that unless the military retreats from politics and allows genuine civilian democratic rule in Pakistan things will not change.

The recent counter-terrorism mechanism is a good example of the problem. It sounds good in theory but like many such theoretical models will not work in practice. The basic problem in India-Pakistan relations is the lack of trust on either side and the long history of grievance. That needs to be tackled at the people-to-people level along with long-lasting changes in Pakistan's political structure.

It is good to see the glass as being full but it is more important to avoid seeing a glass where there is none to begin with.